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POLICY BRIEF
[Job] Locked and [Un]loaded
The Effect of the Affordable Care Act Dependency Mandate on Reenlistment in the U.S. Army
Michael S. Kofoed and Wyatt J. Frasier

BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n We test whether access to parents’
health insurance led soldiers to not
reenlist in the Army.
n The ACA allowed people under
age 26 to stay on their parents’ health
insurance.
n We compare soldiers aged 23–25,
who gained access, to soldiers aged
27–30, who did not.
n We find the younger soldiers’
reenlistment rates fell 5 percent
relative to the older soldiers’ rates.
n Younger soldiers leaving were more
likely to enroll in college, possibly
helping their job opportunities.

O
ne concern that policymakers have regarding employer-sponsored health insurance
is “job lock” and its effects on labor markets. Workers value health benefits, but

health benefits are not transferable across jobs. Thus, a worker could want to pursue
a more desirable job opportunity but may choose not to because that worker might
lose her health insurance coverage. This condition could cause a worker to forgo
career satisfaction or promotion or advancement. Policymakers worry about this
phenomenon because it may limit worker effectiveness and lower the incentive toward
entrepreneurship.
One goal of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), passed in 2010, is to increase the
portability of health insurance across jobs. In our study, we examine the effect of the
dependent mandate (in which young adults under 26 years old are permitted to remain
on their parent’s health insurance) on reenlistment rates for soldiers in the U.S. Army,
a relatively healthy group for whom we can observe many characteristics typically not
available for private-sector workers. We use variation from the policy change to compare
soldiers aged 23–25 to those aged 27–30. We compare these groups before and after
the passage of the ACA. While the younger group gains access to their parents’ health
insurance after ACA enactment—even if they leave the Army—the older group does
not. This difference-in-differences approach allows us to estimate the causal effect of
having health insurance from an external source—one’s parents—on reenlistment of
active-duty military members in the Army. We find that reenlistment rates were similar
for soldiers aged 23–25 and 27–30 before the ACA, but once soldiers under 26 became
eligible for their parents’ health insurance, the younger soldiers began to leave the Army
at a rate 5 percent higher than before the policy change, while rates for the older soldiers
did not change appreciably. Moreover, the increase in leaving was concentrated among
soldiers with higher test scores. It appears that flexibility achieved through the ACA may
be bad for the firm (in this case the Army), because it is losing some of its most talented
employees once job lock is removed. However, the outcomes may be positive for the
overall labor market and for affected individuals, who now have greater ability to pursue
additional education and/or labor market prospects.

Background

For additional details, see the full working
paper, [Job] Locked and [Un]loaded: The
Effect of the Affordable Care Act Dependency
Mandate on Re-enlistment in the U.S.
Army, at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/300/.

Analyzing “job lock”—that fear of losing health benefits prevents workers from easily
changing jobs, attending college, or starting a business—is difficult with traditional
survey data because important considerations such as the health status of the worker,
differences in insurance generosity, and whether a worker quit or was fired are generally
unknown. However, the United States Army serves as a perfect “laboratory” for this
question.
Through affiliation with the United States Military Academy, we have access to
detailed data regarding soldiers and dependents from the Office of Economic and
Manpower Analysis (OEMA). In our data, we observe a soldier from the day she joins
the Army to the day she separates. Our office has begun to link these data to those from
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After ACA passage in
2010, younger soldiers
began to reenlist at a
lower rate, and this effect
appears to persist over
time.

other federal agencies to understand what happens when a soldier leaves the Army.
When a soldier joins the Army, she signs a contract that binds her to the military for
between three and six years. During military service, soldiers must maintain strict health
and fitness requirements, but they receive free health insurance (called TRICARE) and
are compensated at the same fixed-rate schedule (within pay grade). At the end of an
enlistment contract, the Army evaluates the solider and her job performance and then
decides whether to make an offer of reenlistment; if offered, the soldier then chooses
whether to reenlist or separate. These institutional characteristics allow us to control for
many factors that could affect a person’s employment decision that are not available in
traditional labor market data.
Divergence in Reenlistment Rates

We compare reenlistment rates for two age groups of soldiers—those 23–25 and
those 27–30—before and after implementation of the ACA. Figure 1 shows the average
reenlistment rate for each group for every year in our sample. The dashed line represents
our “Treatment Group” of soldiers who are 23–25, while the solid line represents our
“Control Group” of soldiers who are 27–30. Before the ACA, younger and older soldiers
reenlisted (when offered the opportunity) at nearly the same rates. After 2010, however,
younger soldiers began to reenlist at a much lower rate, and this effect appears to persist
over time. For the Army, this meant reenlistments fell by more than 3,200 soldiers,
requiring additional costs and time to recruit and train replacements. But can we
attribute the fall in reenlistment rates to the ACA, or did it stem from something else?
One concern about these visual findings is that different characteristics of the soldiers
could be driving the results. However, when we control for the soldier’s gender, race,
home state, and education level, our findings do not change at all. Another concern could
be differences in reenlistment bonuses. In the Army, soldiers of the same rank, branch,
and month of contract expiration are assigned the same bonus. We included a control
that allowed us to compare soldiers of similar rank and branch who differ only in age.
While the magnitude of our result shrinks slightly, it remains sizable.
It is also possible our findings are a result of deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan. For
example, if casualties spike because of an increase in violence, younger soldiers may
become more risk averse and less likely to reenlist. Alternatively, because unemployment
Figure 1 Reenlistment for Soldiers Aged 23–25 and 27–30, from 2007 to 2013
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While our results may
be discouraging for
the Army, they may be
positive for individuals
and the labor market.
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was increasing during the Great Recession at the same time that the ACA took effect,
some older soldiers may have been more likely to reenlist to avoid a difficult job market.
Additionally, since some states were expanding Medicaid during this period, we may
worry about how the generosity of the home state’s welfare programs affected the
decision to reenlist. However, when we add controls for each of these factors, our core
results remain unchanged.
Finally, because the Great Recession led to an onslaught of new regulations and laws,
the change in reenlistment rates could instead be affected by a policy change other than
the ACA. To check this possibility, we simulate two “pretend” or “placebo” changes.
First, we compare reenlistment rates of soldiers aged 27–30 with those aged 30–33; since
neither age group was affected by the ACA, we would not expect their reenlistment rates
to change differently. Second, we compare the original early-20s and late-20s age groups,
but we pretend that Congress passed the ACA in 2008 instead of 2010. Since this did not
actually happen, we would not expect reenlistment rates to change differentially in 2008
and 2009. Indeed, when we change the ages of the treatment groups or the timing of the
policy change, our results disappear. Thus, like a combination on a locker, we see changes
in reenlistment rates only when we combine the right age group that was affected by the
policy with the correct year in which the policy change occurred. These “placebo” tests
are evidence that our results are a consequence of the ACA and not some other outside
influence.
The Key to Job Lock?

To show that the decrease in reenlistment is a product of job lock, it would be helpful
to understand whether soldiers are leaving the Army for increased opportunities, such as
higher- paying jobs or additional schooling. Unfortunately, we have not linked our Army
data with income data, but we can access GI Bill usage from the Department of Veterans
Affairs. We find that soldiers who have access to their parents’ health insurance are about
1 percentage point more likely to use their GI Bill benefits, from a base of 53 percent.
This result shows that, with the increase in separate health coverage, soldiers are leaving
the Army for educational opportunities.
Our findings present an interesting conundrum for the Department of Defense and
health care policymakers which might not be unique to the military. For example, we also
find that the drop in reenlistment rates of younger soldiers who subsequently use their
GI Bill benefits is concentrated among those with the highest military standardized test
scores, suggesting that employers may be losing some of their most talented employees
once job lock is removed. This loss is particularly painful for the Army because the
military does not allow “lateral” hires (i.e., management from outside the organization)
among its active-duty personnel. For the Army to have future senior leaders—from
senior noncommissioned officers to colonels and generals—it cannot simply hire
managers from the private sector, but must grow them from 20-year-olds who start their
careers as privates (if enlisted) or lieutenants (if commissioned officers). Thus, the Army
will need to increase its recruiting and retention spending to ensure that it manages its
talent efficiently.
However, while our results may be discouraging for the Army, they may be positive
for individuals and the labor market. We provide evidence that the ACA decreased
labor market frictions from job lock. Once health insurance becomes portable (through
eligibility for a parent’s plan), the soldier—and possibly other employees—can now afford
to pursue acquiring additional human capital that may lead to better job prospects.
Note: The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the United States
Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.
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